Truth: The Lost Virtue in Title VII Litigation
Stephen Plass"

I. INTRODUCTION
"[H]onesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty.

'

A county prosecutor said recently, "'If perjury were water, the
people in civil court would be drowning."' 2 Yet, "search for truth"
expeditions are rarely undertaken by the United States Supreme
Court in civil cases. The Court's criminal law precedents teach, however, that false testimony or evidence given under oath can result in
penalties that are sometimes severe. Even constitutional protections
must sometimes yield to truth-seeking goals during criminal trials.
The Court's tradition of penalizing dishonesty makes curious its decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks' to reward employer fabrication
and assign lies rebuttal power against an employee's prima facie
case.

4

Interestingly, the Court's perjury jurisprudence in the civil context is virtually nonexistent, although the importance of truth is
paramount in civil cases. 5 This article looks at the impact of the
Court's failure to channel its truth-seeking energies in one narrow

Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIc 261 (WalterJ. Black, Inc., 1942).
2 Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (May 1995) (quoting E.
Michael McCann, a county prosecutor who also chairs the ABA Section of Criminal
Justice). McCann was also quoted as saying: "'Outside of income evasion, perjury is
probably the most underprosecuted crime in America."' Id. at 69. The article further notes: "Most of the more than 50 state and federal judges, as well as lawyers
and academics, interviewed ... agree that perjury in some form permeates civil and
criminal courts." Id.
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
4 See id. at 507-08. The employer testified that the employee was
fired for workrelated infractions and insubordination although it never disciplined previously for
the charged misconduct and had staged the confrontation that triggered the insubordination contention and discharge. See id.
Protecting one's finances is often as important as protecting one's freedom.
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area of civil practice: Title V1I 6 discriminatory-treatment litigation.
When the Court decided the Hicks case it recognized that there is a
continuing problem with workplace bias.' What the Court may have
underestimated, however, is the extent of such discrimination" and
the lengths to which employers will go to cover it up. 9 As the Court's
civil rights jurisprudence moves more toward "color-blindness,"'0 and

6

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524 ("The prohibitions against discrimination contained
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy.").
8 For example, a recent study done by a non-partisan
think tank concluded that
"[d]espite significantly closing the educational gap, black Americans still trail whites
in wages and employment opportunities ... [in significant part because of] [a]n increase in labor market discrimination along with a drop in the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws .... " See Study: Blacks Continue to Trail Whites in Wages and Job
Opportunities,MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30, 1995, at 7A.
9 See RALPH NADER & WESLEYJ. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OFJUSTICE IN AMERICA 100-14 (1996) (discussing the abusive discovery
practices of corporate executives and their lawyers, and offering several Title VII
cases as examples).
The recent actions of Texaco executives also serve as a good publicized example. See Sharon Walsh, Texaco Suspends 2 Officials Who Used Racial Epithets, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al (Texaco's chairman "suspended two executives and cancelled job benefits of two retirees .... [In tape recorded conversations] officials referred to black employees as 'niggers' and 'black jelly beans' and discussed shredding documents and keeping two sets of books regarding the hiring and promoting
of blacks and women.").
10 The color-blindness the Court envisions today has ajudicial legacy that can
be
traced to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), where it was rejected. In his dissent
in Plessy, Justice Harlan stated that
[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our constitution is colorblind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law.
Id. at 559 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
One critic of the Court's color-blind jurisprudence noted that
[t]he ideal of a color-blind Constitution is close to securing five
votes on the Supreme Court for the first time since it was considered
and rejected during Reconstruction.
In cases where they found it politically convenient, the conservative Justices were obsessively attentive to constitutional history. They
exalted the understanding of the Anti-Federalists over the Federalists,
of Lincoln over Calhoun. But in the race cases, there is conspicuous
silence. Discussions of the original meaning of the Reconstruction
amendments - from which the conservatives claim to derive the principle that the Constitution is color-blind - are nowhere to be found.
And no wonder. An examination of the historical evidence suggests
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given the human propensity to lie," it becomes especially important
that honesty play a greater role in Title VII litigation.
Despite overwhelming dissatisfaction and frustration with litigant and lawyer dishonesty, scholars have completely overlooked the
truth-finding implications of the Hicks decision. 2 This is a major
that the original intentions of the radical Republicans in 1865 are
flamboyantly inconsistent with the color-blind jurisprudence of the
conservative justices in 1995.
Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791, 791 (1996).
Moreover, color-blindness has never benefited blacks. SeeJamin B. Raskin, From
"Colorblind" White Supremacy to American Multiculturalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
743, 743-44 (1996) (noting that many justices are quick to embrace justice Harlan's
color-blindness advocacy even though they are fully aware that color-blindness has
always been a facade for white supremacy); see alsoJohn E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall
of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345, 395-404
(1995) (observing that recent Court decisions show that a majority of justices lack
sympathy for Title VII plaintiffs).
In the late 1980s, the Court began shifting its focus from interpreting employment discrimination laws favorably for minorities to construing those laws as a protective device for innocent whites. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition IV:
Affirmation of Affirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.

903, 908 (1993).
1 SeeJonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 893-94
(1984). Specifically, Van Patten and Willard state:
It is well known that defendants, with disturbing frequency, find that it
serves their financial advantage or collateral personal motives to deny
claims they know are valid .... Yet few courts have considered the application of malicious prosecution principles to the bad faith defense
of a civil action .... Failure to proscribe such conduct encourages

dishonesty and allows abuse and misuse of legal processes.
Id. See also D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some
"Striking"Problemswith FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976)
("And, though dishonestly defending a lawsuit may not generate the same disapproval as dishonestly bringing one, in the individual case it is certainly as dishonest
and probably as unjust.").
Allowing employers to fabricate a defense is particularly destructive when you
consider that by the age of two children have already figured out that punishment is
assured if they admit wrongdoing while denial makes punishment unlikely. See
LYING AND DECEP1TION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 93 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saarni eds.,
1993).

12 Scholarship in this area essentially is limited to evaluating whether the Court
correctly interpreted Title VII and its precedents construing that statute when it assigned plaintiffs a "pretext-plus" burden. Commentators offer a variety of proposals
including the adoption of the "pretext-only" rule. See generally Robert Brookins,
Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv.
939 (1995); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REv. 997 (1994); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., GettingIt Right:
Uncertainty and Error in the New DisparateTreatment Paradigm,60 ALB. L. REv. 1 (1996) ;
William R. Corbett, The "Fall"of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus" and the Escalating
Subordination of Federal Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will: Lessons
from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305 (1996); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stum-
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oversight. To the extent discriminatory conduct is shielded because
employers defend successfully with lies, Title VII loses its effectiveness
to stem workplace discrimination. This Article argues that the Hicks
decision is as much a referendum on the continuing irrelevance of
truth in employment discrimination litigation as it is a prescription
for each party's burden in such cases.
By analyzing the Court's Title VII precedents, this Article demonstrates the compelling need - and statutory and precedential
support - for requiring truth from employers in Title VII litigation.
Further, the Article shows that there is no shortage of truth-seeking
guides the Court may use to bring integrity to this area. Judicial demands for honesty from Title VII claimants and severe penalties
against dishonest plaintiffs provide examples in this area. This Article also offers the Court's criminal law precedents as an effective
source of guidance on this subject. Finally, the Article recommends
that the Court follow Congress's lead by deciding cases in a way that
evidences an understanding of the magnitude of employment discrimination and the tremendous difficulty of proof, given the human
propensity to deceive. To deal with the inevitability of litigant dishonesty, this article recommends the adoption of bedrock jurisprudential rules that penalize dishonest litigants routinely.
II. BACKGROUND

Since the enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
(Title VII), I3 the Supreme Court has made a concerted effort to establish effective proof frameworks for parties litigating under this
statute. While a great deal of energy was expended by the Court
ironing out who bears what burden and how it could be met, 4 discussion about perjury was noticeably absent from its decisions. Given
the Court's preoccupation with the parties' evidentiary responsibilities, its failure to address the effects of false testimony is particularly
curious. 5 That omission is magnified by the recognized unavailabilbling Three-Step, Burden-ShiftingApproach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 703 (1995); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MicH. L. REV. 2229 (1995).
13 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
14 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
15 SeeJOHNJ. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES
AND MATERIALS § C, Ch. 11
934 (5th ed. 1989) ("The law of evidence is concerned with one of the most complex undertakings in the entire litigation process - the reconstruction of past
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ity of reliable documentary proof of discrimination, which makes the
integrity of witnesses critical to the outcome of such proceedings.
Although the Court's "perjury" jurisprudence is well developed
in the criminal area, and Title VII has been in effect since 1964, the
evidentiary impact of Title VII litigant dishonesty was not considered
until recently. In Hicks,16 the Court addressed the operational effects
of a response fabricated by an employer to rebut an employee's
prima facie case in a discriminatory-treatment lawsuit. The Court
ruled that a false reason produced by an employer to justify an adverse decision rebuts plaintiffs prima facie case and destroys the presumption of discrimination it created.
III. THE HICKS DECISION

Melvin Hicks, a black man, was fired after being disciplined progressively for performance infractions. It was evident that the employer wanted to discharge Hicks because of the sudden and repeated discipline imposed on this otherwise good employee.' s
Hicks's downfall began with some organizational (leadership)
changes, through which he received a new supervisor who apparently
began watching him closely. The new supervisor's focus was not
Hicks's personal misconduct (none apparently existed), but the infractions of Hicks's subordinates, which Hicks failed to control.'
Hicks therefore found himself in the unusual situation of being disciplined for subordinates' violations of company rules, and failure
"properly" to investigate a fight.2 0 Ultimately, his supervisor provoked
a confrontation that resulted in a heated exchange of words
and
21
Hicks's subsequent discharge for threatening his supervisor.

events in an effort to arrive at 'the truth."').
16 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
17 See id. at 504-05.
1S See id. at 505
(stating that the evidence revealed that Hicks was a satisfactory
employee).
9
See id. For example, Hicks received a reprimand for not investigating a fight
properly, a five-day suspension for not protecting against subordinates' rule violations, and a demotion for his subordinates' failure to keep proper logs. See id.
These infractions all occurred within a one-month period. See id.
20 An employer certainly has the right to discipline supervisory personnel
for failing effectively to respond to subordinates' misconduct. However, in practice, St.
Mary's did not discipline supervisors for the type of subordinate infractions at issue.
See id. at 508.
21 See id. (noting that the confrontation occurred in
April but Hicks was not discharged until June).
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Because arbitrary or illegitimate decision-making is not a workplace norm, 2 Hicks was able to show at trial that the discipline imposed on him was extraordinary. 3 He proved that supervisors were
never disciplined for rule infractions of subordinates, that similar or
more serious rule violations by co-workers resulted in little or no discipline, and that his supervisor staged the confrontation to secure his
discharge. 4 Additionally, the employer testified at trial that there was
no personal animosity between Hicks and the supervisor with whom
he had the confrontation. 5
Despite Hicks's success at establishing a prima facie case of race
discrimination and demonstrating that the reasons given by the em-.
ployer for his discharge were lies, the Court ruled that Hicks was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 6 According to the Court,
Hicks's substantial showing simply got lost in the milieu of a presumption that kicked in with the prima facie case and dropped off
when the employer offered two false reasons for his discharge. Specifically, the prima facie showing entitled Hicks to a presumption of
discrimination, which if unrebutted by the employer, would have resulted in a finding of discrimination.
St. Mary's did not stay silent, however, and attempted to rebut
the prima facie showing with evidence of Hicks's poor performance
and misconduct. 28 At this stage of the proceeding, the employer's
burden was limited to producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Hicks's discharge.2 Although St. Mary's proWhite employees typically are not subjected to adverse employer decisionmaking because of their race. Recognizing this fact, courts generally require that
white employees prove "special circumstances" when they allege race-based discrimination. See Malamud, supra note 12, at 2296; see also Give All Americans a
Chance .. ,WASH. PosT, July 20, 1995, at A12 (reporting President Clinton's statement that only a small percentage of whites file complaints alleging reverse discrimination).
2
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978) ("[WIe know from our experience that more often than not people
do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in
a business setting.").
24 See Hicks, 509
U.S. at 508.
2
See id. at 543 (Souter,J., dissenting). The Court acknowledged the trial court's
finding that Hicks failed to prove that the crusade to fire him was racial rather than
personal. See id. at 508. Justice Souter pointed out, however, that St. Mary's did not
argue that the discharge was the result of a personal crusade, and the offending supervisor testified that there was no personal animosity between him and Hicks. See
id. at 543 (Souter,J., dissenting).
26 See id. at 509.
27

See id.

28

See id. at 507.
See id. at 509.
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duced fabricated evidence, the Court concluded that the false evidence counts and operates to rebut Hicks's prima facie case. s" Therefore, Hicks lost the benefit of the prima facie presumption and had
to prove that St. Mary's reasons were a mere "pretext for discrimination." Hicks attempted to establish this pretext by demonstrating
that the discipline levied against him was unprecedented, severe, and
programmed."1 Despite this proof, the Court ruled that Hicks was
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 It reasoned that proof
that St. Mary's lied was not proof that it discriminated.
Such a show
ing, the Court added, only assisted with the greater task of proving
discrimination.3 4 That the fact finder disbelieved the employer does
not compel a finding of race discrimination - and one is not a substitute for the other.3 5
A.

Battling Congress

The Supreme Court's analysis in Hicks seems to diverge from the
congressional intent underlying Title VII. And although Congress
has overruled many of the Court's Title VII decisions,36 the Hicks case
suggests that the Court is still not pleased with the textual directives
and legislative history Congress has provided for Title VII. Moreover,
despite Congress's signal to the Court that most of its recent Title VII
decisions were wrong because of their constriction of employee protection,3 the Hicks decision nonetheless retains an anti-employee orientation, and simultaneously promotes employer dishonesty.
50 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509. The court ruled that St. Mary's introduced evidence
of two reasons that were non-discriminatory. See id. These reasons must be regarded
as true at the time given and no credibility assessment is made at this time. See id.
By providing the two reasons, St. Mary's satisfied its burden of production, which
operates to rebut the prima facie case and destroy the presumption of discrimination. See id.
31 See id. at
508.
32

See id.
at 509.

35 Seeid. at510-11.
34 See id. at 511.
35 See id. at 514-15 ("But nothing in law would permit us to substitute
for the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation
of its action was not believable.").
36

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991),

(overruling the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642

(1989)).

For a broader discussion highlighting the nature and intensity of the

Court's battle with Congress, see Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal
Autopsy, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1095 (1993).
See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989)

(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not apply to discrimination occurring after the
employment relationship begins); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
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Continuing congressional reinforcement of employment discrimination laws can be interpreted as a desire that the Court be
more employee-sensitive when evaluating the stubborn problem of
workplace bias. This proposition becomes more salient when one
considers that Congress has extensive expertise on the subject of discrimination.'" Using Congress's work product, the Court has the resources to deter both workplace discrimination and litigant dishonesty. The Court, however, appears to be mired in a dispute with
Congress about anti-discrimination prescriptions and, consequently,
unable to focus on the thorny problem of litigant dishonesty.
In Hicks, the Court ruled that plaintiffs burden is that of proving that the employer's lies were "a pretext for discrimination," as
opposed to a pretext for some non-prohibited reason.39 According to
the Court: "That the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or
even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the
plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct."' 0 Such an elusive, motive-based requirement destroys the inferential weight of proving a
prima facie case plus impeaching the employer's defense by requiring further proof that is either unavailable or unresponsive to the
particular evidence produced by the employer purporting to legitimize its actions. As such, the Hicks decision signals the Court's continuing determination that employers need a buffer from the rules
Congress established for prohibiting discrimination. 4' By avoiding
656-57 (1989) (requiring plaintiffs to prove causation in impact cases); Lorance v.
AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989) (restricting the time within which employees
can challenge discriminatory seniority policies); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (limiting plaintiffs' ability to recover attorney's fees from losing intervenors).
Congress has been passing laws to prohibit discrimination since the end ofthe
Civil War. For example, the Reconstruction civil rights statutes such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1868), were designed to make blacks legal
equals and buck the prevailing culture of subordinating blacks in every aspect of
their existence. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 99-

100 (1970). To that end, blacks were given the right "to make, and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " ch. 31, 14 Stat. at 27. For a discussion of the equality goals envisioned by
the civil rights statutes and the Supreme Court's frustrations of those goals, see A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM:
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 76-91 (1996).
39

RAcIAL POuTIcS

& PRESUMPTIONS

OF

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516.

40 Id. at 524.
41 See id. at 533 (Souter, J., dissenting).

For example, Justice Souter stated that
"[t]he Court today decides to abandon the settled law that sets out this structure for
trying disparate-treatment Title VII cases, only to adopt a scheme that will be unfair

to plaintiffs, unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who
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textual mandates and statutory precedents through the use of gram-.
matical exercises, the Court effectively assumes the roles of legislature and interpreter of the laws governing equal employment for
all. 2 By protecting and rewarding employer lies, the Court not only
impairs the judiciary's functioning, it undertakes the unscientific task
of assigning blame and responsibility in employment disputes as well.
What is more, the Court's continuing dissatisfaction with Congress's
work has distracted it from the broader evil of accommodating lies.
IV. SEARCHING FOR TRUTH USING CRIMINAL LAW GUIDES

At the turn of the century, the Court ruled that a grant of immunity did not include Fifth Amendment protection against perjury. 43 The Court later reaffirmed its position that perjurers are not
afforded Fifth Amendment protection, and added that they are not
entitled to Miranda warnings either. 44 The Court noted that
"[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic
concepts of judicial proceedings .... [and] '[i]t would render the
sanctity of the oath quite meaningless to require admonition to adhere to it.'

45

As such, a witness appearing before a grand jury must

provide honest responses to the questions he chooses to answer or
face prosecution for perjury.
To ensure from the outset that witnesses testify truthfully, the
Court has approved perjury prosecutions even when the false testi-

mony is retracted. 46 Focusing on the hardships false testimony causes
present false evidence in court." Id. The Justice added: "What is more, the Court is
throwing out the rule for the benefit of employers who have been found to have
given false evidence in a court of law." Id. at 537.
42 Moreover, the political incentive or muscle needed
to get Hicks overturned is
apparently absent. Legislation introduced to overrule Hicks has gone nowhere. See
Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 3680, 103d

Conf. (1993).
See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911). This conclusion was
reached by interpreting a statute that clearly and specifically provided for a contrary
result. See id. at 140-41. The Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to require the bankrupt, as ordered by the Court, to "submit to an examination concerning the conducting of his business... but no testimony given by him shall be offered
in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding." Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544, 548 (1898), as amended, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978). Placing statutory goals
over plain text, the Court ruled that the right to prosecute for perjury must be preserved. See Glickstein, 222 U.S. at 143-44. As such, false testimony by the bankrupt is
not immune from prosecution. See id
See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1976).
Id at 576, 581-82 (quoting United States v. Winter, 348 F. 2d 204, 210 (2d Cir.
1965)).
46 See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564
(1937). In this case, the witness, Nor-
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the courts and opposing parties, the Court has noted that "the oath
administered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the truth in
the first instance and not to put the court and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by
cross-examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral
",47
means.

Criminal defendants have paid heavily when the Court has embarked on truth-seeking forays. In a series of decisions, the Court
ruled that the Fourth Amendment must yield to the Court's truthseeking function. For instance, illegally obtained evidence may be
used to impeach a defendant's testimony.48 Further, a suppressed
statement may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony because
"[t]he shield provided by Mirandacannot be perverted into a license
to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances. 4 9 Statements obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment may also be used for impeachment
purposes. Moreover, the government is entitled to "proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth."'" Hence,
defendants
52
efet must testify
Cor truthfully even if they are compelled to do
so. In effect, the Court has elevated truth-acquiring considerations
over constitutional protection, thereby risking a likely increase in po53
lice misconduct if prosecutors are free to use suppressed evidence.

ris, had given false testimony to a Senate committee investigating campaign expenditures. See id. at 570. He recanted and corrected this testimony at trial, however. See
id. at 570-71. The Court found that recantation did not absolve the crime of perjury,
which was committed when the deliberate lie was told. See id.at 573-74.
47 Id. at 574.
48 See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)
(noting that "there is
hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility").
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
50 See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) ("[T]he shield
provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.").
51 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620, 627 (1980).
52 See id. at
626.
53 The Court finally responded to its recognition that police
misconduct would
increase if illegally obtained evidence, although generally suppressed, could somehow be used against the defendant. SeeJames v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1990)
(extending the impeachment exception to defense witnesses would not advance the
goal of truth-seeking to the same extent as when applied to the defendant himself).
For a critique of the "preservation of the judicial integrity" and "deterrence of police
misconduct" rationales for the exclusionary rules, see generally James L. Kainen, The
Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionay Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN.
L. REv. 1301 (1992).
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Further, the Court has insisted on the truth even when it results
in depriving mostly poor minority defendants of their constitutional
right to counsel." In Perry v. Leeke,55 for example, the Court ruled
that a defendant does not have a right to confer with his counsel during a cross-examination recess because
it is simply an empirical predicate of our system of adversary
rather than inquisitorial justice that cross-examination of a witness
who is uncounseled between direct examination and crossexamination is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is
cross-examination of a witness
who is given time to pause and
56
consult with his attorney.
The absence of empirical data showing that counsel would
coach the defendant to lie or that such coaching could not be impeached effectively on cross-examination did not deter the Court
from its conclusion.
Another Court-approved methodology for coercing the truth
out of criminal defendants likely has no parallel in the civil context.
5 7 the Court reaffirmed that it
In United States v. Dunnigan,
is constitutionally permissible to increase a defendant's sentence if he testifies
falsely at trial and thereby obstructs justice.5 The Court stated that
"[t]he perjuring defendant's willingness to frustrate judicial proceedings to avoid criminal liability suggests that the need for incapacitation and retribution is heightened as compared with the defendant
charged with the same crime who 59allows judicial proceedings to progress without resorting to perjury.,
As the criminal law precedents show, there is an extensive and
refined reservoir of truth-sensitive Court decisions. It would therefore have been a small step for the Court to apply such principles developed in the criminal area to its Title VII analysis. Although an
See generally Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice and the American Way: The Case
Against the Client Perjury Rule, 47 VAND. L. Rrv. 339 (1994).
488 U.S. 272 (1989).
Id. at 282; see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (holding that a
defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when his attorney
threatened to impeach his testimony and withdraw if he carried out his stated intention to testify falsely).
57 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
59 See id. at 97-98. The Court reasoned that sentence
enhancement is as effective

a deterrent of false testimony as a separate perjury prosecution. See id. at 97.
59 Id at 97-98; see also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978)
("No rule
of law, even one garbed in constitutional terms, can prevent improper use of firsthand observations of perjury. The integrity of the judges, and their fidelity to their
oaths of office, necessarily provide the only, and in our view adequate, assurance
against that.").
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abundance of evidence is available in its Title VII precedents that indicates truth-seeking is a priority in such litigation, the Court's focus
in Hicks was skewed by its misunderstanding of what employers sometimes do with incriminating evidence.
In deciding the Hicks case, the Court left in place many of the
ground rules established by its Title VII precedents. For example,
the Court reiterated that a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case through generalized proof and by a preponderance of the evidence.M This standard provides the plaintiff with a presumption of
discrimination.6 ' The presumption imposes on the employer the
burden of going forward with the evidence. 62 Once the prima facie
case has been established, the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment if
the employer stays silent and does not attempt to rebut it.6 Should
the employer decide to respond, however, its only responsibility is to
produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, because the burden of proving discrimination remains with the plaintiff
for the duration of the case." The Court's analysis falls short, however, when confronted with the reality that the employer can offer
any explanation for its actions.
The Court ruled that proven-false reasons produced by the employer operate to rebut the presumption of discrimination created by
the plaintiffs prima facie case.6 Whether the employer's explanation is true or false is not to be judged at the time of production.
Rather, the employer's proof is to be taken as true and will operate to
rebut plaintiffs presumption, which then falls out of the case.6 6 Using its criminal law precedents as a guide, the Court could have rejected this procedural rule as being at odds with the rule in Nix v.
Whiteside67 that even a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify does not include the right to testify falsely.6 8 In effect, Hicks allows
60

See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993).

61 See id. at 506 (reiterating this rule as described in Texas Department
of Commu-

nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981), and generally supported by rules of
evidence).
62 See id at 507 (citing Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
0 See id. at 509.
See id. at 507. The Court noted that McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411
U.S. 792
(1973), only shifted the burden of production to the employer, and the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not allow the "burden of proof" to shift. See Hicks, 509 U.S at

507.

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.
See id.
67 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
See id. at 173 ("Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely.").
65
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a defendant employer to avoid potential Title VII liability by introducing testimony that would otherwise be prohibited to a criminal
defendant attempting to rebut the state's prima facie case in order to
secure his freedom.
Further, the introduction of false testimony deprives plaintiff of
an opportunity for effective cross-examination. In Title VII cases, the
right to cross examine is no less critical than in criminal prosecutions, where the Court has ruled that the government is entitled to
"proper and effective cross-examination," 69 and therefore defendants
are compelled to testify truthfully. Moreover, proof of employer dishonesty does not inure to the employee's benefit in the same manner
as proof that a defendant perjured himself gives advantage to the
prosecutor. 0 Additionally, the presumption of discrimination cannot
be resurrected later when a credibility determination is made that
the employer's reason was fabricated.' In the end, the plaintiff is left
with the inferences stemming from his prima facie case plus any inferences drawn from demonstrating that the employer lied, which
may suffice to prove intentional discrimination.73 The plaintiff, however, is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply by establishing a prima facie case and proving pretext by demonstrating that the
employer lied.73
As rationale for its conclusions, the Court cited Title VII precedents and general evidentiary rules governing presumptions and
burdens of proof. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reasoned that
a plaintiff s obligation to show pretext as outlined in Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine4 is that of showing "pretext for discrimination."75 As such, proof that the employer lied is not necessarily proof that the employer is trying to cover up discriminatory motivation. The implication is that the employer may be lying to cover up
0 See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
For example, the prosecutor is allowed to circumvent constitutional protections to impeach the accused if he lies. See, e.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
65 (1954) (stating that the defendant's untruths could not be protected by the illegality of the government's evidence-gathering methods).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510. The Court rejected the "resurrection" theory that
had been used by some lower courts to reinstate the presumption once the employer was shown to be dishonest. See id. The Court found such an approach violative of the rules set out in Burdine. See id.
See id. at 511 ("Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination ....
").
73 See id. (noting that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons"
does not
"compel [I judgment for the plaintiff").
70

74 450
75

U.S. 248 (1981).

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-16.
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something that is not prohibited by Title VII. For example, the employer may be lying to hide an embarrassing or other non-prohibited
reason and would be punished wrongly by a conclusion of discrimination in such cases.
To the extent that the Burdine opinion contains statements that
proof of pretext is sufficient to command judgment for plaintiff, Justice Scalia interpreted the language as dictum and inadvertent, ultimately making the rest of the Burdine opinion "incomprehensible or
deceptive. 7 6 He added that proof that the employer lied also does
not mandate judgment for the plaintiff because there may be record
evidence suggesting a nondiscriminatory motive, and Title VII does
not require that the employer prove motivation." Further, Justice
Scalia noted that traditional evidentiary and procedural rules routinely give liars an advantage, and presumptions do not shift burden
allocations.7 8 These conclusions are alarming not only because of
their inconsistency with the Court's preoccupation with truth in the
criminal area, but because they pay lip-service to a terrible national
problem - employment discrimination and dishonest employer denials of wrongdoing.
The technical substantive requirement that plaintiffs prove
"pretext for discrimination" after proving general pretext frustrates
the remedial goals of Title VII. Title VII was enacted to combat widespread discriminatory conduct by employers, not to insulate wrongful
behavior. Concededly, employees sometimes file baseless claims,
which harm employers. The legislation's primary goal, however, was
not to protect employers from vexatious or harassing discrimination
lawsuits. Recognizing the difficulties employees face in proving discrimination, the Court previously interpreted the statute in a way that
gave employees a fair chance to prove their cases and employers a
reasonable opportunity to defend. 79 Hence, a prima facie requirement for plaintiffs was constructed to screen in only those plaintiffs
who have eliminated obvious business-related or nondiscriminatory
explanations for adverse decisions, thereby earning the benefit of an

76

See id.at 518.

7

See id.at 520-24.

78

See id at 521-22.

See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711
(1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a good critique of the proof defects of the Court's decisions, see generally Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination
Cases: Toward a Theory of ProceduralJustice,34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981).
7.
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inference of unlawful conduct.8' The prima facie case must be
proven by-a preponderance of the evidence."'
In addition to the Court's plaintiff-oriented sensitivity to the notion that smoking-gun evidence is unavailable generally, the Court
ensured that the plaintiff was still assigned the responsibility of proving prohibited conduct, which may be inferred when direct proof is
absent. On the other hand, employer-oriented sensitivity was shown
in the form of a light burden to articulate (not prove) a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision. 2 Once the employer produced an explanation, plaintiff bore the responsibility of
proving it was pretextual; this could be achieved with circumstantial
evidence such as statistics and comparative (disparate) treatment
data.8"
The Hicks Court dealt Title VII a major blow by refusing to treat
employer dishonesty as perjury or sanction-producing conduct. In
fact, the Court marginalized the truth-seeking function of Title VII
trials by ruling that:
[T]here is no justification for assuming... that those employers
whose evidence is disbelieved are perjurers and liars ....

Un-

doubtedly some employers (or at least their employees) will be lying. But even if we could readily identify these perjurers, what an
extraordinary notion, that we "exempt them from responsibility
for their lies" unless we enter Title VII judgments for the plaintiffs! Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury; we have other
civil and criminal remedies for that .... The books are full of

procedural rules that place the perjurer (initially, at least) in a
better position than the truthful litigant who makes no response
at all.8 4

This attitude is alarming because of the difficulty of proving perjury, its many defenses,85 and the general reluctance of courts to
80 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (holding that plaintiff must show his

race, that he applied, he was qualified, he was rejected, and the vacancy continued).
81 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
82 See id.
at 253.
83 See id. at 253, 256. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that a plaintiff can
rely on evidence that comparable acts by white employees did not generate the same
response; the company's reaction to the employee's civil rights activities; the company's overall policy and practice with regard to minorities; and statistics showing "a
general pattern of discrimination." See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. At this
early evolutionary stage of Title VII jurisprudence, the Court did not detail the evidentiary impact once the respective burdens were met.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 520-21 (1993).
For example, recantation may act as a bar to prosecution. See United States v.
Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 282 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970), which allows
a person who previously made false statements under oath to recant such testimony
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make such a finding.86 After all, false testimony may stem from,
amohg other things, faulty memory, carelessness, inadvertence, or
negligence. Justice Scalia touched on this reality in the Hicks opinion, noting:
Even if these were typically cases in which an individual defendant's sworn assertion regarding a physical occurrence was pitted
against an individual plaintiffs sworn assertion regarding the
same physical occurrence, surely it would be imprudent to call the
party whose assertion is (by a mere preponderance of the evidence) disbelieved, a perjurer and a liar .... To say that the
company which in good faith introduces such testimony, or even
the testifying employee himself, becomes a liar and perjurer when
the testimony is not believed, is nothing short of absurd."
But even if carefully crafted false defenses such as those raised in
Hicks do not rise to the level of punishable perjury, they still represent dishonesty that obstructs justice and frustrates Title VII. Such
obstruction ofjustice should trigger the Court's truth-seeking sensors
and condemnation.8 At a minimum, such testimony should be dis"in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding" and be free from prosecution provided certain conditions are met). Additionally, proof of vindictiveness or
discrimination can have a similar effect. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253, 255
(9th Cir. 1978) (stating that the defendant in a perjury trial had not "shown that he
was treated differently from others similarly situated, nor proven that [the] alleged
discrimination by the prosecutor was based on invidious criteria"); Commonwealth
v. Hude, 425 A.2d 313, 321 (Pa. 1980) (referring to a perjury indictment of a criminal defendant, who had been acquitted of all charges at his initial trial, as an
"overzealous prosecution").
8G Courts would much rather treat false statements as honest
mistakes, negligent
errors, inadvertence, carelessness, or misunderstandings. See United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. Robertson, 494 N.W. 2d 718, 725
(Iowa 1993). And false statements expressed as opinion or belief are not perjurious.
See People v. French, 26 P.2d 310, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (opinion); Shorette v.
State, 402 A.2d 450, 454 (Me. 1979) (belief). If the misrepresentation was the result
of a misunderstanding triggered by a vague or ambiguous question, the conclusion
of perjury is foreclosed. See United States v. Ceccerelli, 350 F. Supp. 475, 478 (W.D.
Pa. 1972). The same conclusion will be reached if the false statements stemmed
from the witness misunderstanding or misinterpreting questions. See State v. Douglas, 349 N.W.2d 870, 882-83 (Neb. 1984). The nuances of language and communication may also affect whether a court concludes that perjury was committed. See generally Peter Meies Tiersma, The Languageof Perjury: "LiteralTruth, "Ambiguity, and the
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 373 (1990).
87 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 520-21.
88 Courts have utilized an existing range of possible sanctions for dishonesty
that
obstructs the administration ofjustice. For example, contempt proceedings, Rule 11
sanctions, or 18 U.S.C. § 401 and § 1503 may be used. On the propriety of utilizing
these devices, see Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 381 (1919) (contempt), and Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1959) (finding the defendant guilty
of contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960).
Section 401 provides in relevant part: "A court of the United States shall have
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regarded or deprived of its harmful procedural and substantive attributes.
The Court's apparent resignation to employer dishonesty is in
direct contrast to its condemnation of dishonesty in criminal litigation even though the evidence has the propensity "to put the court
and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross-examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral means" in both the civil and criminal

power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its
authority, and none other as, - (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
Additionally, § 1503 provides:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any
grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States,
or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding
before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit
juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment
assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner, or other committing
magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of
his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982); see also Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 383 ("[T]here must be added
to the essential elements of perjury under the general law the further element of
obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty."); United States v. Barfield,
999 F.2d 1520, 1523 (1lth Cir. 1993) (stating that the omnibus clause, "which deals
with a person who 'corruptly endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration ofjustice'... 'is broad enough to encompass any act committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impede or obstruct justice."'); United States v. Susskind,
965 F.2d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that false testimony by itself is not necessarily
an obstruction of justice); United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that it is "reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to proscribe
any intentional effort to impede the due administration ofjustice, regardless of the
means employed"); United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1990) ("We
have held consistently that false testimony can provide the basis for a conviction under section 1503 ...In doing so, however, we have heeded the Supreme Court's
admonition that not all false or evasive testimony constitutes obstruction ofjustice.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1979)
(maintaining that false testimony is contemptuous when it obstructs justice in addition to being perjurious); Richardson v. United States, 273 F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir.
1959) (stressing that criminal contempt proceedings cannot substitute for perjury
prosecution); United States v. Barfield, 781 F. Supp. 754, 759 (S.D. Ala. 1991)
(noting that false testimony that blocks the flow of information to a grand jury is an
obstruction ofjustice).
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contexts. 89 What is more, it contravenes the Burdine standards that
were designed to coerce the litigants gently into telling the truth.
V. BURDINE'S TRUTH STANDARDS

The evidentiary impact of the parties meeting their respective
burdens was detailed in Burdine. The Court reaffirmed that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff for the duration of the
case and the prima facie case gives a plaintiff a presumption of discrimination. 0 The employer can respond to the prima facie case by
merely producingevidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.91
The employer is not required to persuade the court that its decision
was motivated by the proffered reason. If the employer remains sihowever, the plaintiff is entitled to
lent after the prima facie showing,
2
judgment as a matter of law.1
Should the employer decide to respond, its evidence must be
admissible, clear, reasonably specific, and legally sufficient.93 These
parameters were intended to respond specifically to fears that an
employer might abuse its light burden to "articulate" a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason by fabricating a non-prohibited reason.94
The stated purpose for refining the employer's responsibility is
"progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question
of intentional discrimination." 9" This is so because a plaintiff must
have a clear target to attack to meet its burden of demonstrating pretext; that is, that the employer's stated reason is not its true reason.
Regardless of the stage at which the employer's proffered reason is
evaluated, Burdine states: "The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these
functions."" This sentence, which immediately follows the requirement that the defendant produce a clear legitimate reason, notifies
employers that spurious reasons are unwelcome.
Burdine further provides that the pretext burden merges with the
ever-present burden of persuasion, thereby allowing the plaintiff to
win in two ways: "either directly by persuading the court that a dis-

89

United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).

90 SeeTexas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
91

See id at 254.

92 See id

93 See id at 255-56. (stating that the employer's reason must be clear and specific

in order to give plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to respond and show pretext).
94 See id at 257-58.

95 Id. at 255 n.8.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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criminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. 9 7 The Hicks Court made an important concession in its
reading of the above-quoted language by stating: "We must agree
with the dissent on this one: The words bear no other meaning but
that the falsity of the employer's explanation is alone enough to
compel judgment for the plaintiff. 98 But although Justice Scalia has
articulated a preference for plain meaning construction9 and has
been anointed a textualist by some legal scholars,' 0° he refused to accept the Burdine Court's plain statement that proof of pretext alone is
a sufficient basis for a plaintiff to win. Instead, he characterized this
language as dictum that contradicts other statements in the opinion
and other Court precedents. 1 '
Nothing in the language or its location in the Burdine opinion,
however, suggests that it is anything other than an essential statement. The Justices in Burdine placed this pronouncement in the text
of the opinion rather than in one of the many footnotes added to illustrate points. It follows on the heels of a very rigorous consideration of the plaintiffs and defendant's burdens. Without it, the opinion would be like a story without an end. Further, it carefully guides
the reader through the evidentiary and procedural nuances of proving discriminatory-treatment cases, detailing how plaintiff may win or
lose at every step. Indeed, Burdinewould be strange reading if all the
Justices agreed to end their pretext analysis with the sentence that
comes before the alleged dictum; i.e., "This burden now merges with

97

Id.

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993).
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989). Specifically, Justice Scalia has stated:
Of course, the extent to which one can elaborate general rules from a
statutory or constitutional command depends considerably upon how
clear and categorical one understands the command to be, which in
turn depends considerably upon one's method of textual exegesis.
For example, it is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges to
develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to
the plain meaning of a text.
Id. at 1183-84.
100 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623
(1990) (quotingJustice Scalia as stating "that if the language of a statute is clear, that
language must be given effect"); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement and the Problem of Legislative
Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 770 (1991) (noting that Justice Scalia would argue
"that the statutory language itself provides the only truly reliable evidence of the legislative understanding").
98

99

101 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517.
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the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the
victim of intentional discrimination.', 0 2 Moreover, it appears that the
Court would not have been perturbed if the latter part of the sentence under attack was taken out. In fact, the charge of dictum
might not have been made if the sentence had read: "She may succeed in this ...directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer."
The charge that proof of pretext as proof of discrimination contravenes other statements in Burdine and other Court precedents is
irrelevant. Prior to Burdine, a great deal of confusion about the parties' burdens was created by numerous unexplained statements in the
Court's early Title VII decisions.
Burdine attempted to bring some
order to this area, and to that end carefully addressed each step of
the proof process. No Court decision prior to Burdine stated that
proof of pretext alone will not do; nor does such a statement run
afoul of any other statement in Burdineitself. That a majority of the
Justices in Hicks were not sensitive to the truth-coercing attributes of
pretext proof as proof of discrimination does not make it a contradiction.
A. Truth Aspects of the ProductionBurden
In the Hicks decision, Justice Scalia marginalized the importance
of the employer's responsibility to produce some explanation and be
honest in that production. While the burden of production is a light
one, it nonetheless encompasses a tangible quantum of evidence that
4
includes
elements
honesty.1by
To
an employer
can
meet its burden
of of
production
notconclude
producingthat
anything
true is tan-

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
103 For example, such terms as "articulate" and "prove" were used interchangea102

bly, causing confusion about the employer's burden. What evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the employer's burden of production was also an open question. See,
e.g., Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)

(asserting that to articulate, show, and prove are all different standards); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (requiring that an employer must

"prove" legitimate reason); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (stating that an employer must "articulate" legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).

104 See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979)
(finding
that to satisfy this burden one must articulate a valid reason through specific averments); In re Dependency of C.B., 810 P.2d 518, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
that the burden of production in ordinary civil cases requires a showing of substantial evidence).

19981

TITLE VII LITIGATION

619

tamount to eliminating the light responsibility imposed on employers
by McDonnell Douglasv. Green'0 5 and its progeny.
While Burdine may have adopted traditional evidentiary rules
with respect to presumptions and the kinds of evidence that may
serve as rebuttal, it clearly did not accommodate, insulate, or encourage employer dishonesty. The Burdine Court recognized that light
evidentiary responsibilities may encourage employer lying because a
determination of the evidence's credibility normally can be made
only after it has operated to rebut the presumption. To combat this
potential for abuse, the Court sharpened the employer's obligation
to that of producing clear and specific evidence. Further, it provided
for a "sufficiency" determination once the reasons were produced to
help prevent employers from providing and benefiting from arbitrary
or dishonest reasons. Proven fabrications of the type used in Hicks
are not the quality of production contemplated by Burdine and
should not meet Burdine's sufficiency requirement. Additionally,
even if it is procedurally incongruous to determine sufficiency before
pretext evidence is introduced, the sufficiency requirement counsels
that it is defendant's false reasons that ought to drop off, thereby
leaving only plaintiffs prima facie evidence and pretext proof. Thus,
even if plaintiff must lose his presumption, the only remaining evidence in the case would be plaintiffs prima facie and pretext proof,
which would guarantee judgment as a matter of law.
B. Interpreting "Legitimate"as "True"
Burdine's "legitimate nondiscriminatory" requirement also negates the proposition that false evidence should have the heavy
weight it was assigned by the Hicks Court. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "legitimate" as "[t]hat which is lawful, legal, recognized by law, or according to law." °6 If the word legitimate is construed to mean "lawful" then placing the word nondiscriminatory
after it would make the standard redundant. Under such a formulation, the employer's burden would be to provide a "lawful nonprohibited" reason for its decision.' 7 The fact is that the employer in
a Title VII dispute is only obliged to produce reasons that are not

105
0
'07

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
BIACK's LAw DICTIONARY 901 (6th ed. 1990).

The Court has increasingly moved to a text-focused approach resulting in

statutory language being assigned its literal or ordinary meaning. Justice Scalia is
the leading advocate of this approach. See Eskridge, supra note 100, at 623; David 0.
Stewart, By the Book: Looking Up the Law in the Dictionary, 79 A.B.A. J. 46-47 (July
1993).
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prohibited by Title VII. That obligation does not encompass prohibitions by other laws. For instance, an employer that shows that it
took adverse action solely because an employee was a whistle-blower
does not violate Title VII. As such, ascribing the legal meaning to the
word "legitimate," in this context, would be inappropriate.
The other option is to give the word "legitimate" its customary
or non-legal meaning. Webster's Dictionary defines legitimate as
"being exactly as purposed: neither spurious nor false."' 8 Coincidentally, Black's Law Dictionary also offers the customary definition:
"Real, valid, or genuine."'0' Application of a customary definition
brings coherence to the nondiscriminatory requirement. For example, under Webster's definition "true nondiscriminatory" versus "false
or spurious nondiscriminatory" makes logical sense. Substituting
real, valid, or genuine from the Black's definition also eliminates redundancy in the standard. Moreover, interpreting legitimate as honest avoids the Hicks Court's determination that lies were not arrested
at the pretext stage by securing judgment for plaintiff upon proof of
dishonesty. That it is not uncommon for evidence to be admitted in
civil cases only later to be found incredible does not convert purposefully fabricated proof into Title VII type "legitimate" evidence. Ultimately, while Burdine's legitimacy requirement may not be enforceable at the outset, its specificity does provide a basis for inferring
discrimination when violated.
Additionally, Burdine required clear, satisfactory, and true reasons gently to coerce honesty and thoughtful decision-making by
employers. As such, employers are on notice that negative inferences
may be drawn from unarticulated or falsely stated explanations. As
Justice Souter noted, proof that the employer lied strengthens plaintiff's case because it is generally presumed that lies are intended to
cover up illegality." This assessment is typical and consistent in our
legal culture, which treats fabricated evidence variously as a presumption that the truth is detrimental or that the defense is without foundation."' Somejudges have even treated fabrications as an admission
108 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

683 (1984).
See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 106, at 901.
110 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 536 (1993) (Souter, J., dissent19

ing) ("[I]t is 'more likely than not' that the employer who lies is simply trying to
cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff.").
III See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 166 (1996) ("The fabrication of evidence raises a presumption or, more properly, an inference that the truth, if disclosed, would be detrimental to the interest of the party who has been guilty of such an improper act.");
29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 243 (1994) ("The fabrication of evidence raises a presumption or inference that the supposed action or defense of the party guilty of fabrica-
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of fault, or as evidence that one's case is weak."' Further, proof of
dishonesty has uniformly served to strengthen the other party's case.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's conclusion in Hicks, a litigant generally
does not have to attack unarticulated ghosts lurking in the record.
And the triers of fact need not search the record or demean plaintiff s proof because the employer is evasive or failed to be specific.
Burdine established a scrupulous balance of employer and employee
proof responsibilities grounded in an expectation of truth. Under
Burdine, an employer assumed the risk that its failure to give plaintiff
the true reason for its decision would result in an adverse ruling
based on plaintiff's pretext proof. Although the Hicks Court was
quick to note that employer lies rebut the presumption of discrimination, it conveniently avoided detailing the reinforcing effects of
proven lies on plaintiff's case.
C. The Truth About ManagementPrerogatives
Part of the Court's rationale for its conclusion that proven falsehoods do not equal discrimination stems from Title VII's recognition
of management prerogatives."5 The Burdine Court specifically noted
that the statute was "not intended to 'diminish traditional management prerogatives."' ' 1 4 Other Supreme Court precedents also affirm
the notion that courts are less competent than employers to decide
the appropriateness of particular business practices." 5 This sentition is without foundation."); see also Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir.
1959) (finding that fabrication raises a presumption against the party fabricating);
Kuhnen v. Kuhnen, 184 N.E. 874, 878 (Ell. 1933) (holding that fabrication raises a
presumption that the case is without substantial foundation).
112 See, e.g., Gung You v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 848, 850 (9th
Cir. 1929) (asserting that
fabrication is a "badge of weakness"); Silva v. Northern California Power Co., 162 P.
412, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917) (stating that fabrication is an admission that one's case
is legally insufficient); D'Arcangelo v. Tartar, 164 N.E. 87, 88 (Mass. 1928) (holding
that false testimony equals an admission of fault).
113 Before the enactment of Title VII the Court formulated and reaffirmed a deferral to management prerogatives doctrine in its labor law decisions. That doctrine
was carried over to the employment discrimination area and has functioned to limit
employee statutory protection. See Marley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrimination in CapitalRedeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901, 922 n.89 (1989). For
a discussion on this doctrine in particularized labor contexts, see generally David L.
Gregory, Labor Contract Re'ection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in
NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REv. 539 (1984); Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in
Public Sector Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19
U.C. DAviS L. REv. 597 (1986).
114 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 259 (1981)
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)).
115 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 661 (1989) ("'Courts are
generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices[.]'
[C]onsequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that an
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ment has been echoed by lower courtjudges who note that courts are
not personnel managers" or super-personnel departments.I 7 This
rationale underscores a rule of deference even in cases where the
employer offers a false explanation for its decision. It also facilitates
speculation by courts about the possible existence of non-prohibited
reasons other than the false ones offered by employers.
Although Title VII did not strip employers of entrepreneurial
discretion and control, the discretion to run one's business does not
include the right to discriminate and cover it up with lies. Title VII
also did not empower judges to identify and substitute their own explanation for that of the employer. To the extent that an employer
cannot produce a reason not prohibited by Title VII, there exists no
concern about interfering with business judgments since none was
articulated. In fact, to say that the employer retains unstated nondiscriminatory reasons is to contravene Burdine and interfere with the
employer's business or strategic determination to keep those reasons
secret. By speculating or offering its own explanation for employer
conduct, a court violates the rule of non-involvement in management
affairs. By substituting its own theories for unexplained employer
conduct, a court in effect decides what is sound employment or litigation practice.
D. The No-Reason Myth
The Hicks opinion noted the need to protect employers who did
not violate Title VII but did not have a reason or may have been
ashamed or otherwise unwilling to articulate the true reason for their
actions. Such a position does not have a practical foundation, however. In any event, an employer that makes decisions in this manner
is unlikely to survive very long in a competitive marketplace. More
reasonable is a conclusion that the employer always has a "business"
employer must adopt a plaintiffs alternative selection or hiring practice in response
to a Title VII suit.") (citations omitted); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 999 (1988) ("In evaluating claims that discretionary practices are insufficiently related to legitimate business purposes, it must be borne in mind that
'[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.'")
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). Both Wards Cove and Watson quote an
earlier case, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
16 See Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851
F.2d 1503, 1507-08 (5th Cir.
1988) ("The [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment decisions, nor was it intended to
transform the courts into personnel managers.") (emphasis added).
11
See Young in Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir.
1993) (citing Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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reason and is highly cognizant of it"" Even more, from the employer's point of view, the reason is in most instances business related. While the employer is not required to prove business necessity
in discriminatory-treatment cases, an honest employer producing a
business reason would be extremely effective in rebutting plaintiffs
prima facie case and ultimately prevailing on the merits.
The reality is, however, that some employers still stratify their
work force along racial lines."" Such employers may regard prohibited acts as proper or necessary business decisions. These determinations are likely to result in employer dishonesty during litigation,
which is the evil that Burdine's "legitimate" requirement ought to
guard against.20 Under these circumstances, the need to give substantial evidentiary weight to plaintiff's proof of falsehoods, and the
importance of reducing the effects of employer dishonesty, are evident. For example, if an employer decides not to promote a woman
to a senior position because it would offend her male counterparts,
the employer may view passing over the female employee as good for
the morale, team spirit, and productivity of senior male employees.
Likewise, an employer may not hire a black person for a front desk
job because of perceived client preferences. Although the rejection
of black applicants on the basis of color violates Title VII, employer
118 See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. The Court in Furnco noted that:

A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because
we know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
119 The segregation of workers along racial lines as practiced
by the employer
Wards Cove is a good example. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647. The dissenting Justices highlighted the stratification by stating:
The salmon industry as described by this record takes us back to a kind
of overt and institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in
years: a total residential and work environment organized on principles of racial stratification and segregation, which, as Justice Stevens
points out, resembles a plantation economy. This industry long has
been characterized by a taste for discrimination of the old-fashioned
sort: a preference for hiring non-whites to fill its lowest level positions,
on the condition that the) stay there.
Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted); see also Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and the Supreme Court: A
Ref orm Programfor Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 241, 251-53 (1994).
120 The Court noted in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977),
that the primary evil Title VII was designed to address was discriminatory treatment
of employees. See id.
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business concerns about continued patronage and goodwill may
nonetheless control the decision-making.
Other prohibited decisions may be tied to incumbent employees' comfort level with other racial and ethnic groups or, in a competitive employment market, fears about job security. Such attitudes
may be generated by the employer's tradition of having a homogeneous (white) work environment thereby triggering the belief that
homogeneity is more healthy and productive. Because employer decision-making is often tied to "differences" in employees, the likelihood of dishonesty is heightened because reliance on some of those
differences is prohibited. Hence, the value assigned to plaintiff's
proof of falsity becomes critical. Couple this with employer freedom
to articulate any legitimate reason rather than the actual reason, and
the destructive impact of the Hicks decision is heightened. Consequently, the Hicks Court's conclusion that proof of employer lies does
not foreclose the existence of record evidence of a legitimate reason
or conclusively demonstrate discrimination effectively reverses the
truth-generating proof structure of Burdine.
Once an employer relies on prohibited considerations in making an employment decision, logic dictates that that decision be defended to the end. In structuring its defense, an employer's options
include lying, destroying incriminating data, or hiding information
that helps prove plaintiffs case. The magnitude of employment discrimination is difficult to document because proof of employer racial
animus is generally unavailable. For instance, it is evident from the
tape recordings in the Texaco case that employers hide and destroy
damaging evidence of employment discrimination.'
Less obvious,
however, are the multiple ways employers may hide the truth.
Consider for example, an employer that has a policy that provides for discharge upon proof of theft. The employer's policy is defined broadly to include any unauthorized viewing or copying of
company records. In implementing this policy, the employer has
never discharged a white employee but resorted to other disciplinary
action including transfer. A black employee notices a white coworker's personnel records on her supervisor's desk and reads them.
The black employee determines that the white employee makes substantially more than she does despite her superior experience, education, and training. The black employee confronts her supervisor with
this information and is discharged for theft of company records. If
the black employee sues alleging discrimination, the employer may
121

See generally Walsh, supra note 9, for a discussion of the Texaco case.

TITLE VII LITIGATION

1998]

625

not reveal its inconsistent implementation of the theft rule during
discovery. Without independent evidence to the contrary, the black
employee's case could be in serious peril. In other words, by simply
withholding this information, the employer could possibly determine
the outcome of the case.
VI. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY
Although not expressly stated, the Hicks Court responded in part
to the reality that employees also lie in the course of litigating employment discrimination suits. The fact is that protected individuals
lie and use allegations of discrimination to keep their jobs or secure
employment benefits. If employees can drag employers into court
with generalized and potentially false allegations of discrimination,
then granting similar freedoms to employers to defend may seem to
be fair play to level the playing field. After all, the Court notes, we do
not call the Melvin Hickses of this world liars when their discrimination suits are dismissed."
In a backhanded manner, the Court suggested that plaintiffs alleging discrimination are often liars who abuse statutory law to the
detriment of American businesses, and this practice can only be curtailed by shoring up the ability of employers to defend themselves
against such suits. 2 3 Justice Scalia's demand that plaintiffs prove intent after proving pretext highlights his continuing belief that "it is
difficult to imagine any small business hiring a minority employee
which does not, in doing so, commit its economic welfare and its
good 24
name to the unpredictable speculations of some yet unnamed
1
jury.
One federal judge took the employer-victim concept much further by writing that Title VII
unquestionably has served to deter, if not entirely eradicate, the
pernicious practice of discrimination in employment decisions. It
has, however, also unquestionably served to embolden disgruntled
employees, who have been legitimately discharged because they
were incompetent, insubordinate, or dishonest, to file suits alleging that they have been the victims of discrimination. The motives prompting those baseless filings may be inferred to be harassment or intimidation with a view towards being rehired.

See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 520 (1993).
For a discussion of the Court's particularized focus on protecting employers
from what may be baseless claims, see generally McCristal Culp,Jr., supra note 119.
124 Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
22
23

J., dissenting).
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Whatever the motives, the frequency with which such cases are
filed unduly burdens the federal courts and subjects innocent
employers to incredible expense which they cannot recoup if successful ....

12

Malicious threats or suits alleging discrimination are clearly intolerable for reasons beyond integrity. The substantial costs to defend such suits rank high on the list of evils that false allegations
bring. A law-abiding employer may also be stigmatized by wrongful
allegations and develop negative stereotypes about members of protected groups. 6 With readily available business reasons and a light
defense burden, however, the malicious employee's claim will likely
be short-lived. While an employer caught lying in litigation benefits
from its dishonesty, an employee similarly situated faces a great likelihood of dismissal with prejudice in addition to sanctions.'27 Hence,
even if an employer is later sanctioned for lying, it retains the inherently beneficial advantage of doing so. An employee, on the other
hand, may lose an otherwise meritorious case in addition to incurring costs.
A. Employee Dishonesty Priorto FilingSuit
Dishonesty on the part of employees prior to suing for discrimination, but unknown to the employer, has often resulted in harsh
consequences. Although the employer was unaware of the misconEdwards v. Interboro Inst., 840 F. Supp. 222, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
For example, an employer might develop a general belief that all protected
employees view Title VII as ajob guarantee rather than a narrow constraint on management prerogatives.
127 Title VII plaintiffs would likely be happy if the only judicial
response to their
dismissed claims was a label of dishonesty. Available data suggest that such plaintiffs
face the strong likelihood of sanctions. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to
Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 790 (1995); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REv. 1775,
1783 (1992); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 490
(1989). In his article, Carl Tobias states:
Recently assembled information derived from reported decisions
shows that an inordinate number of sanctions has been sought in civil
rights cases, that rule 11 motions have been filed and granted against
civil rights plaintiffs much more frequently than civil rights defendants, and that such plaintiffs have been sanctioned at a considerably
higher rate than those who pursue any other type of federal civil litigation.
Id; see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicato? of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2192 (1989) (claiming that Rule 11 is biased against
the substantive rights of civil rights claimants); Anne S. Rampacek, The Impact of Rule
11 on Civil Rights Litigation, 3 LAB. LAW. 93, 96-97 (1987) (stating that judges are defendant-friendly and often invite Rule 11 motions in civil rights cases).
125
126
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duct and therefore did not rely on or consider it at the time the illegal decision was made, such employee wrongdoing sometimes
oper2 81
victim.
discrimination
a
for
relief
to
bar
complete
a
ates as
This denial of relief for dishonesty flourished'9 in the civil rights
context even though its common law genesis makes it unsuitable for
addressing statutorily prohibited employment acts.' 0 Title VII prohibits certain employer conduct, namely decision-making grounded
in race, religion, sex, color, and national origin. T3 It also established
a remedial scheme for victims of such wrongful conduct. The statute
128

See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir.

1988). For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
falsification of company records "akin to the hypothetical wherein a company doctor
is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex, and the company, in defending a
civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a
'doctor'. [In such a case] the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief .... " Id; see also Washington v. Lake County, Illinois, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir.
1992) (denying relief for failure to note conviction of crime on employment application); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1992);
Johnson v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992)
(denying civil rights claim based on misrepresentations in employment application
because the false information was material, relevant, and relied upon by the employer); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1188 (11th Cir. 1992)
(Godbold,J., dissenting) (finding that the national policy on discrimination did not
contemplate vindication of right by dishonest claimant). But see id. at 1180 (stating
that a denial of relief "is antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII - to
achieve equality of employment opportunity."); Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank,
831 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that a denial of relief creates a
"'windfall to employers who, in the absence of their unlawful act and the ensuing
litigation, would have never discovered' the wrongdoing") (citations omitted). For a
general discussion of the evolution of the after-acquired evidence doctrine, see
Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive Dissonance, 60 Mo. L. REV. 89, 102-16 (1995).
129 See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305, 308 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (holding
that misrepresentations on application bar Title VII sexual harassment claim and
EEOC guidelines to the contrary are not entitled to deference); Rich v. Westland
Printers, Inc., No. HAR 92-2475, 1993 WL 220453, at *6 (D. Md. June 9, 1993)
(granting no relief for plaintiff in Title VII sexual discrimination case because of
fraudulent employment application); Redden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1262, 1270-71 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (granting no relief for plaintiff in Title VII race discrimination case because of resum6 fraud).
,30 The concept of resum46 fraud or after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct has been used as a defense by employers in wrongful discharge cases. See 39
C.J.S. Master and Servant § 105 (1925) ("Where a sufficient cause exists for the discharge of a servant, although not the inducing motive to the discharge, or even
known to the master, it will justify the discharge."). The doctrine also operates in
the nature of an estoppel by denying an employee standing to sue because, "but for"
the falsification, he would not have obtained employment. The Restatement of
Contracts also has an analogous principle that a contracting party has the power of
avoidance "even if he is ignorant of his power of avoidance .... " RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 385, cmt. a (1979).
121 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988).
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does not provide for employer absolution in cases of employee dishonesty unknown to the employer. In fact, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 amends Title VII to ensure that employer consideration and reliance on prohibited factors is deterred. 2 Employers that rely on
impermissible considerations but also have legitimate reasons for
their decisions face the prospect of an adverse declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, or award of attorney's fees.'33 As one district court
judge observed, Title VII's purpose is to eliminate discrimination in
the workplace and make injured employees whole.'m The judge
noted that that goal was reaffirmed by the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
which provides that an injury occurs whenever illegal motives play a
role in the employer's decision-making, even if legitimate reasons
were present or later surface.' 5
On the other hand, anti-discrimination laws are not enacted to
shield employee wrongdoing either. So, although Tide VII's primary
focus is employee protection, it does not saddle an employer with
employees who, except for the discrimination contention, would
have faced an adverse decision. As such, when employee dishonesty
(wrongdoing) gains them a benefit, but employer discrimination
takes it away, one must delicately balance the competing parties' interests in deciding accountability.
The Supreme Court confronted this situation in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.' 36 While recognizing that Title VII's
major goal is to protect employees, the Court ruled that employees
must pay a price for misconduct.1 7 In ruling that after-acquired evi132 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. 1075-76
(1991). Section 107(b) provides:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
703(m) and respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be
directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section
703(m); and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in
subparagraph (A).
Id.
133 See
id,
134 See Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino,
828 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J.
1993).

15 See id.
13

513 U.S. 352 (1995).

17

See id at 361.
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dence of employee misconduct is not a complete bar to relief, the
Court noted that every act of resistance to anti-discrimination laws
counts."" Congress provided remedial schemes in these statutes for
compensation and deterrence purposes and to force employers to
engage in self-scrutiny and to ensure compliance.139 Because employer prerogatives and discretion remain important, however, the
Court ruled that employees should not receive reinstatement or front
pay."4 As such, dishonest employees must pay a price even if they
prove discrimination.
B. Employee Lies in the Course of Litigation
The case of Pope v. Federal Express Corp.'4 ' is a good example of
judicial response to employee lies in Title VII actions. In this sexual
harassment suit, the employee plaintiff was accused of fabricating 412a
note with sexually suggestive words attributable to her supervisor.
She relied on the note during deposition, in responding to interrogatories, and when filing pleadings. 4 The employer was able to
establish through expert testimony that the handwritten note was a
"cut-and-paste" job. 44 Further, the employer demonstrated that the
employee had cut out the words from the performance evaluation of
another employee and rearranged them. The employer then asked
for dismissal, sanctions, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, imposed sanctions against the
plaintiff, awarded the employer attorneys' fees, and ordered plaintiff
to bear all costs.' 45

The court reasoned that plaintiff's conduct was

abusive, evidenced bad faith, and was "an attempt to perpetrate a
fraud on the court.' 46 Further, the court found that allowing the
138
See id.at 358-59. To benefit from the misconduct evidence, employers are required to show that the employee would have been fired for the wrongdoing alone.
See id. at 362-63. This requirement, however, does not appear to be a serious obstacle for employers in view of the scant evidence courts routinely find sufficient. See
Rebecca Hanner White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 35 B.C. L. REV. 49, 52-53 (1993).
139 See McKennon,
513 U.S. at 357-58.
140 See id. at 361-62.
Although the Court recognized the make-whole purpose of
compensation (back pay) and that employers would have remained unaware of the
misconduct had it not been for the discrimination, it limited back pay to the period
from the date of discharge to the time that the misconduct was discovered. See id.
141
138 F.R.D. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1990).

14
14
144

See id. at 677.

See id. at 678-81.

See id.at 678.

See id. at 683-84. Sanctions were also imposed on plaintiff's attorney for failure
to make a reasonable inquiry about the note. See id.
146 Id. at
683.
145
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lawsuit to continue "would be an open invitation to abuse the judicial
process.', 4 7 Similar sanctions were imposed on employees for making
false statements to the court in Perkins v. General Motors Corp.'48 and
49
Bynum v. Michigan State University.

Penalties for employee lying can be even more multidimensional. For example, the court in Vargas v. Peltz'50 exposed a
sexual harassment plaintiff to, among other things, criminal and immigration prosecution. In Vargas, the plaintiff accused her employer
of, among other things, buying her a pair of panties to wear.' 5' The
employer's attorney was able to show that the panties were not manufactured until after Ms. Vargas was terminated. 51 Calling her claim
"outrageous" and "based on a tissue of lies," the judge dismissed
the
suit and ordered plaintiff's attorney to turn over case files to the
United States and State Attorney's offices to determine whether any
criminal law was broken.' 53 The court further exposed plaintiff's attorney to Rule 11 sanctions and promised to write the Immigration
and Naturalization Service stating that Vargas was not fit to be
granted citizenship. 5 4 Such demands for truth are consonant with the
Court's criminal law precedents.
Justice Scalia, the author of the Hicks decision, has also signaled
that he has high expectations of honesty by employees generally. In
evaluating whether the National Labor Relations Board properly exercised its discretion when it granted reinstatement and back pay to
55
an employee who lied during unfair labor practice proceedings,'
Justice Scalia wrote:

17

Pope, 138 F.RD. at 683.

965 F.2d 597, 602 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the district court's
award of
sanctions "were well grounded in fact and law and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion").
149
117 F.R.D. 94, 100 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("[S]anctions must be imposed,
pursuant to Rule 11, for certifying false statements in [plaintiff's] complaint.").
48

150

901 F. Supp. 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1995).

See id. at 1574.
See id. at 1574-76.
153 See Lori Rozsa, Judge Dismisses
Sex HarassmentSuit by Maid, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
17, 1995, at IC and 3C; see also Proof Was in the Panties, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at A8.
151
152

154

See Rozsa, supra note 153, at 1C.

See ABF Freight Sys. Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994). Employee
Michael
Manso lied about a tardiness incident and was subsequently discharged. See id. at
320. Specifically, he told his employer that the reason for his lateness was car problems, which led to speeding and ultimately a police stop causing further delay. See
id. The employer investigated Manso's story and determined it was false. See id.
Manso was discharged for tardiness, not dishonesty, however. See id.
Manso filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge and established through his
15

surrogate the General Counsel, a prima facie case grounded in evidence of em-
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The principle that a perjurer should not be rewarded with a
judgment -

even a judgment otherwise deserved -

where there

is discretion to deny it, has a long and sensible tradition in the
common law .... In any case, there is no realistic comparison between the ABF managers' disbelieved testimony concerning motivations for firing and Manso's crystal-clear lie that he was where
he was not. The latter is the stuff of perjury prosecutions; the
former is not.'
Because tape recordings of employer dishonesty are typically
unavailable, courts must deal with employer dishonesty that is less
ployer anti-union animus. See id. at 322. Specifically, he showed an earlier discharge
in violation of the Act, the establishment of a new tardiness policy that was uniquely
designed to discharge him, and inconsistent application of disciplinary policies. See
id. ABF attempted to rebut the presumption of illegal conduct with evidence that
the implicated management personnel were not familiar with Manso's exercise of
his protected rights, and that its properly enacted and even-handedly applied work
rules determined its treatment of Manso. See Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 441, 446
(10th Cir. 1992).
The Board ruled that ABF failed to meet its burden and therefore did not rebut
the prima facie case. See id. The Board found that ABF used the tardiness incident
as a pretext to discharge Manso for the exercise of protected rights, and reinstated
Manso with back pay plus interest. See ABF Freight Sys., 510 U.S. at 321. In discrediting the employer's proffered explanations, the Board credited Manso's proof that
ABF was out to get him upon his reinstatement from an earlier unlawful firing. See
id. at 321. Further, the record revealed that the employer's adoption of a "strict attitude" towards Manso's job classification appeared arbitrary and unrelated to any
business concerns; that the employer had previously provided notice of its harsh
rules on another subject (call-out), prior to issuing discipline under them; that no
tardiness policy existed at the time Manso was disciplined for his first tardiness; and
that counting the first tardiness incident to establish a second violation for purposes
of discharge amounted to retroactive rule application and discriminatory treatment.
See id. at 320-21.
On appeal, the employer argued that "but for Manso's lying about his excuse,
he would not have been discharged; therefore, he was discharged for his dishonesty," Miera, 982 F.2d at 446. Further, the employer argued that granting
"reinstatement and back pay to an employee who lied to his employer" and also lied
during Board proceedings violates public policy and impedes the policies of the Act.
ABFFreight Sys., 510 U.S. at 322. The court found that ample record evidence supported the Board's findings, and the Board properly exercised its wide discretion in
determining what remedy effectuates the polices of the Act. See id.
In upholding the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court briefly confronted the issue of perjury. See id. at 323. It noted: "False testimony in a formal
proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a 'flagrant
affront' to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings." Id. Although the
Court concluded that Manso's lying under oath was a serious matter, it prioritized
the Board's broad discretion and remedial authority as weightier concerns. See id. at
325. And, unlike the Hicks Court's failure to scrutinize and weigh the impact of employer dishonesty, the Court noted the unfairness of imposing sanctions upon
Manso while taking no action against the company's witness whose testimony was
disbelieved. See id.
'5 ABFFreightSys., 510 U.S. at 329-30 (ScaliaJ., concurring in judgment).
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than obvious but nonetheless present and material to the outcome of
litigation. It is not responsive to Tide VII or traditional rules of evidence to call proof of employer dishonesty mere "disbelieved testimony." Impartial adjudication requires that greater weight be assigned to circumstantial proof of employer dishonesty.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that company representatives lie to defend
themselves in discrimination suits and that some lies may be regarded as principled and morally proper because the employer believes or knows that the undeserving employee is hiding behind Tide
VII's intimidating walls. To be sure, an employer desiring to discharge an incompetent employee, but lacking a documented history
of poor performance, does feel hamstrung when allegations of discrimination surface. To that end, the employer may feel forced to
keep the employee until it builds a sufficient record of performance
infractions. Normally, it should not take long for a truly incompetent
employee to produce enough unsatisfactory work or misconduct to
justify discharge or other adverse action.
The absence of a record should be the exception rather than
the rule, however, because performance evaluations are commonly
used to track employee progress. Such evaluations typically consider
and rely on both the successful and unacceptable aspects of an employee's performance in awarding benefits or taking adverse action.
An employer with a legitimate interest in taking adverse action is thus
well armed with infractions-of-record upon which it can base its decision. Consequently, an employee fabricating a discrimination claim
climbs a steep hill trying to label and prove his employer a statutory
law-breaker.
Like an ordinary discrimination victim, civil rights advocates had
to marshal and expend scarce resources to secure passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to counter the Court's gutting of hard-won employee protection. 5 7 Although employee supporters emerged victorious on many fronts,'5 Congress alone cannot seriously impact some
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employers' propensity to discriminate and cover it up with lies.
Moreover, congressional initiatives would be futile if Congress's perception of the problem is at odds with the Court's.
If the Justices truly believe that employment discrimination is a
problem, procedural proof rules designed for this area should focus
increasingly on coercing truth from the litigants. In this regard,
statutory commands and statutory precedents deserve preeminent
roles. Decisions such as Hicks can only rob the statute of its truthgenerating attributes, which have been overlooked for far too long.
Procedural devices that impede truth-finding encourage a culture of
non-compliance with the law and further delay the long overdue
need to discourage lying in Title VII litigation. Employees are on notice that their dishonesty may produce severe penalties. A similar
signal should be sent to employers.

son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), by expanding 42 U.S.C. § 1981's
coverage to post-hiring discrimination).

